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Legal Personhood and the Firm: 
Avoiding Anthropomorphism and Equivocation 
 
 
1. Introduction 
In order to become a fully operational firm in a modern market economy, an 
entrepreneur or an association of resource owners need to go through a relatively 
straightforward registration (or incorporation) procedure. This constitutive 
procedure creates a separate legal person (or legal entity) with the capacity for 
property, contract and litigation, without which firms would not be able to properly 
function.1 The assignment of separate legal personality is a key aspect of law’s 
institutional support for the firm.   
Legal entity status is a necessary part of the explanation of the firm’s 
enhanced transactional capabilities as compared to bilateral exchange.  In effect, 
the legal system creates an efficiency-enhancing nexus for contracts that literally 
carries the organizational framework of the firm. By vesting ownership rights to 
the assets used in production in the legal entity law secures its continuity by 
locking-in the founders’ committed capital, thereby allowing them to pledge 
                                                          
1 The expressions ‘legal person’ and ‘legal entity’ are used synonymously in this paper, as are 
the expressions ‘legal personality’ and ‘legal entity status’. The expressions ‘registration’ and 
‘incorporation’ are used synonymously to designate the constitu tive procedure by which the firm 
founders duly apply for and obtain the official recognition of the firm’s existence by the legal 
system.  
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assets, raise finance and do business in the firm’s own name (Hodgson, 2002; 
Blair, 2003; Gindis, 2009; Robé, 2011; Hansmann, 2013; Orts, 2013; Deakin et al., 
forthcoming).  
Strikingly, these institutional facts about the role of legal personality in the 
creation and operation of firms are all but absent in the theory of the firm 
literature. In part, this state of affairs is imputable to the general reluctance of 
economists to rely on legal concepts of the firm, and to sustained efforts to define 
the firm with little or no reference to law. Relatively little has changed since 
Masten (1988: 185) observed that ‘economists have either downplayed or rejected 
outright the role of the law in defining the firm’.2  
But the widespread lack of appreciation among theorists of the firm of the 
key economic advantages of legal entity status (Blair, 2004; Schanze, 2006; 
Iacobucci and Triantis, 2007; Kornhauser and MacLeod, 2013) can also be 
attributed to Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) ambiguous discussion in the only 
classic of the genre to mention legal personality. Their dismissal of this ‘legal 
fiction’ that inevitably fuels nonsensical anthropomorphic talk of the firm’s 
objectives and responsibilities has arguably had a lasting and damaging influence. 
This article shows that these fears are unfounded once the meaning and 
functions of legal personality are properly understood. It is important to recognize 
that from the legal point of view ‘person’ is not co-extensive with ‘human being’. 
Nor is it synonymous with ‘rational being’ or ‘responsible subject’. Much of the 
                                                          
2 With the notable exception of Williamson’s (1991) legally-grounded discussion of discrete 
structural alternatives.  
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confusion surrounding the issue of the firm’s legal personality is due to the 
tendency to address the matter with only these, frequently conflated, definitions of 
personhood in mind.  
On the contrary, when the term ‘person’ is defined in line with its original 
meaning as ‘mask’ worn in the legal drama, it is easy to see that it is only the 
capacity to attract legal relations that defines the legal person. This definition 
severs the misleading link between the flesh-and-blood human being and the legal 
person, and opens the gates of the legal realm to firms and other candidates that 
would otherwise be excluded. Importantly, this definition avoids the undesirable 
emotional associations and equivocations that have all too often plagued the 
debate. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents Jensen and 
Meckling’s treatment of legal personality and their associated discussion of 
misleading ‘personalization’. Section 3 compares the underlying conception of 
personhood with other definitions to the found in the history of legal theory and 
philosophy. Building on this discussion, three views of legal personality are 
discussed in Section 4 that shows that the least problematic of the three is derived 
from the original meaning of personhood. Section 5 draws some conclusions for a 
legally-grounded view of the firm. 
2. Misleading “personalization” 
Jensen and Meckling’s (1976: 311) definition of the firm as a ‘legal fiction which 
serves as a nexus for a set of contracting relationships among individuals’, where 
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by ‘legal fiction’ is meant ‘the artificial construct under the law which allows 
certain organizations to be treated as individuals’ (Jensen and Meckling, 1976: 
310, n.12), is the only appearance of the concept of legal personality among the 
classics of the theory of the firm literature. Indeed, it is the only acknowledgement 
that law’s assignment of legal personality is essential to the transaction-cost 
minimizing nature of the firm.  
Coasean theories of the firm are variations on the idea that the contractual 
centralization of transactions, where several input owners make bilateral contracts 
with a central agent, is an efficiency-enhancing institutional arrangement. 
Explicitly or implicitly, in most theories of the firm the central agent is assumed to 
be a flesh-and-blood human being (e.g., entrepreneur, employer, owner) or a group 
of such human beings (e.g., owners, management). For Jensen and Meckling, by 
contrast, the central agent is a legal entity with the legally-endowed capacity to 
enter contractual relations with other parties.3  
However, this rare acknowledgement came with a warning. As they 
explained elsewhere, the fact that transaction costs are reduced when ‘individuals 
and organizations – employees, investors, suppliers, customers – contract with 
each other in the name of a fictional entity’ called ‘the firm’ (Meckling and Jensen, 
1983: 9) should not obscure the truth that, stripped to their essentials, firms and  
imilar organizations are ‘pure conceptual artifacts, even when they are assigned the 
legal status of individuals’ (Meckling, 1976: 548). 
                                                          
3 Jensen and Meckling (1976: 311, n.14) noted in this respect ‘the important role [played by] 
the legal system and the law in … the organization of economic activity’.  
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On this view, one should always be careful about the legal treatment of firms 
as if they were individuals, and resist the tendency to think and talk about firms as 
if they were individuals. While ‘ascribing human characteristics to the [firm] is 
often a useful linguistic expedient’ that has ‘venerable roots in both law and 
economics’ (Meckling and Jensen, 1983: 10), it is vital not to take what is at best a 
metaphorical ascription or a shorthand form of expression for something more. As 
Jensen and Meckling (1976: 311, emphasis in original) famously put it: 
The personalization of the firm implied by asking questions 
such as ‘what should be the objective function of the firm’, or 
‘does the firm have a social responsibility’ is seriously 
misleading. The firm is not an individual.  
The anthropomorphic practice of ‘personalization’ obscures the fact that firms 
cannot be said to ‘have objectives’ or ‘act’ in any particular way. Only individuals 
have purposes, act or can act. From this perspective, since pure conceptual artifacts 
are not the kinds of things that have what it takes to qualify as actors, claims to the 
contrary amount to seriously misleading category mistakes.4 These considerations, 
according to Jensen and Meckling, have important implications for both economics 
and legal practice. 
The implication for economic theory is that the textbook personalization of 
the firm as a profit-maximizing entity must give way to a more realistic view of 
                                                          
4 A category mistake can involve presenting a thing as being of a certain kind when in actual 
fact it belongs to another kind, or attributing a property to something that the thing it is attributed 
to logically cannot have. 
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the ‘behavior’ of the firm. Once attention is shifted away from the ‘black box’ of 
the textbook firm to the actions of individual participants, the behavior of the firm 
can be likened to that of the market, namely: ‘the outcome of a complex 
equilibrium process’ in which the ‘conflicting objectives of individuals … are 
brought into equilibrium within a framework of contractual relations’ (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976: 311).5  
More fundamentally, for Jensen and Meckling, given that firms do not 
qualify as actors law’s assignment of contractual capabilities to the legal fiction 
serving as a nexus for these contractual relations should never be taken to imply 
that firms can be referents of rights and duties. This would be the gravest type of 
personalization. Just as all rights are ‘human rights, i.e., rights which are possessed 
by individuals’ (Jensen and Meckling, 1976: 306, n.6), all duties always ultimately 
belong to individuals. By the same token, costs and benefits can only be borne by 
‘“real” as distinct from artificial beings’ (Meckling and Jensen, 1983: 10).6 
Overall, Jensen and Meckling’s treatment of legal personality is puzzling. 
The commendable acknowledgement that law’s assignment of separate legal 
personality is essential to the transaction-cost minimizing nature of the firm is 
largely overshadowed by the vigorous charges against personalization. They are 
clearly uncomfortable with the idea that the non-human central agent must be a 
                                                          
5 They acknowledged, however, that treating the firm ‘as if it were a wealth-maximizing 
individual’ remained useful for competitive price theory and the overall explanation of the 
functioning of the market system (Meckling and Jensen, 1983: 10). 
6 Likewise, wrote Meckling and Jensen (1983: 10), contrary to proponents of corporate social 
responsibility firms ‘can no more be responsible than can a lump of coal’.  
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rights-and-duties bearing entity if it is to play its efficiency-enhancing role. This 
implication is trivialized and downplayed in their ambiguous discussion that 
suggests a strong and virtually inevitable link between fictitious legal personality 
and misleading personalization.7   
Jensen and Meckling’s definition of the firm as a legal fiction was not picked 
up in the theory of the firm literature, perhaps because it was perceived to be the 
reason for their controversial claim ‘it makes little or no sense to try to distinguish 
those things which are ‘inside’ the firm … from those things that are ‘outside’ of 
it’ (Jensen and Meckling, 1976: 311). Given the literature’s focus on the 
boundaries of the firm, their definition became a convenient foil, and the concept 
of legal personality disappeared from the theoretical narrative as furtively as it had 
appeared. 
However, the rejection of personalization, that Klein and Coffee (1988: 107) 
called the ‘reification illusion’, was picked up and amplified in the new literature 
on the economic analysis of corporate law (Hessen, 1979; Posner and Scott, 1980; 
Fischel, 1982; Klein, 1982; Butler, 1989; Easterbrook and Fischel, 1991). The 
invitation to debunk ‘metaphysical entities in law’ (Posner, 1990: 186), including 
the concept of corporate personality, was typical of the process that Kornhauser 
(1989: 1449) described as a ‘revolution [that] swept the legal theory of the 
                                                          
7 See Ireland (2015) on the ‘schizophrenia’ involved in simultaneously relying on but dismissing 
separate legal personality. 
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corporation’.8  
In this literature, as Bratton (1989: 409) observed, Jensen and Meckling’s 
definition of the firm as a legal fiction that serves as a nexus for a set of 
contracting relations was ‘accorded … the weight of scientific truth’, and ‘received 
… as an ontological discovery’ with significant conceptual and practical 
implications. For years, as a result, anyone interested in both the theory of the firm 
and the topic of legal personality would have found little else on the subject in the 
field of law and economics.   
3. The meanings of personhood 
A long tradition in modern economics holds that the real actor, and hence the 
appropriate unit of analysis, is the rational individual agent (Hayek, 1955; 
Buchanan and Tullock, 1962; Brunner and Meckling, 1977; Pejovich, 1990; Jensen 
and Meckling, 1994; Furubotn and Richter, 1998; Werin, 2003). As real beings, 
individuals are legal persons by virtue of their ‘natural’ capacity to attract rights 
and duties. Any extension of this capacity to non-humans, including both groups of 
individuals and inanimate things, is an artificial distortion of reality that bears the 
‘unnatural’ flavor of anthropomorphism. 
The notion of personhood underlying this position can be usefully compared 
                                                          
8 The expression ‘corporate personality’ normally refers to the legal personality of corporate 
bodies such as associations, clubs, charities, business firms, trade unions, cooperatives or 
municipalities, and is often (misleadingly) called ‘artificial personality’ to mark the difference 
with the ‘natural personality’ of human beings.  
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with other definitions to be found in the long history of the legal and philosophical 
debate. Since persons are basic categories of what Smith (2004: 8ff) called law’s 
‘ontological inventories’, decisions concerning who or what counts as a ‘person’ 
from the legal point of view have profound implications. Just as the chemist will 
refer to the periodic table and see the world as ultimately divisible into basic 
natural kinds, by analogy the legal mind will refer to ‘the persons that populate the 
legal world’ (Vining, 1978: 143).  
As a result, MacCormick (2007: 77) argued, it is difficult to gain ‘an 
understanding of law and how it works’ without some ‘reflection on the idea of a 
person’. The distinction between ‘persons’ and ‘things’, or ‘subjects’ and ‘objects’, 
is indeed fundamental to the construction of law’s periodic table. Since the earliest 
written codes of law in recorded history these legal categories have been 
indispensable building blocks of every system of law and political economy 
(Radin, 1982; Iwai, 1999; Davies and Naffine, 2001; Trahan, 2008).9 Importantly 
for the Western legal tradition, they were central to Roman law.  
The term ‘person’ derives from the Latin persona meaning ‘actor’s mask’. 
This is why the Roman lawyer found it suitable to denote the subject of civil rights 
and duties (Duff, 1938; Derham, 1958; Fuller, 1967; Stoljar, 1973; Hollis, 1985; 
Poole, 1996). A person, as Hallis (1930: xix) explained,  ‘was one who could be a 
party in a legal dispute, one who could, so to speak, act in a legal drama’. 
                                                          
9 As Blackstone (1766: 16, emphasis in original) wrote, the fact that ‘the objects of dominion 
or property are things, as contradistinguished from persons’, cannot be disputed, and the classical 
aphorism attributed to Gaius, that law pertains to persons, things, and actions, remains central 
today. 
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Accordingly, legal persons were the actors that courts gave legal standing to as 
dramatis personae. Closely related to the notion of persona was the concept of 
capacitas that referred to ‘a status conferred upon citizens for the purpose of 
enabling them to participate in the economic life of the polity’ (Deakin, 2006: 
318). 
Not all human beings, however, had legal standing or the capacity to engage 
in the economic life of the polity. In early Roman civil law, for instance, a slave 
was a res (Watson, 1967), a thing that was owned rather than a persona, and 
therefore did not have the right to own property or initiate any legal actions. 
Although in later Roman law slaves acquired some limited rights, including the 
ability to have quasi-marital relationships (Johnston, 1999), it was clear that they 
were not persons in the then legally, socially and economically meaningful sense 
of possessing freedom, citizenship and family rights (Stein, 1999).  
This conception of personhood as legal identity based on social status is not 
confined to the distant past but is central to any discussion of legal personality 
(Pound, 1959). Significantly, over the course of the nineteenth century, both the 
abolition of slavery (1833 in the British Empire and 1865 in the United States) and 
the abolition of coverture for married women (1880s in the United Kingdom and 
the United States) involved a process of acquisition of separate legal personality. 
Before their emancipation, these categories of human beings could not own 
property or be parties to contracts in their own right.10  
                                                          
10 The legal personality of foreigners also had to be progressively defined in each jurisdiction 
(Mark, 2001). 
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The original accent on the social face that each member of society wears in a 
legal or public forum, that List and Pettit (2011: 171) call the ‘performative 
conception of personhood’, contrasts with the definition of the person as an 
‘individual substance of a rational nature’ given in the sixth century by the 
theologian Boethius (cited in Marshall, 1950: 472).11 In fact, as Groarke (2010: 
299) observed, ‘the most striking philosophical feature of the Boethian person is 
that the private and the public components of the person are separated from each 
other’.  
A comparable position can be found in Locke’s (1975 [1690]: 335-336) claim 
that ‘person stands for … a thinking, intelligent being’, and that ‘consciousness 
makes personal identity’ not only at any point in time but also over time.12 
Although Locke also argued that ‘person … is a forensic term appropriating 
actions and their merit’ that ‘belongs only to intelligent agents capable of a law’ 
(Locke, 1975 [1690]: 346), he was less concerned with the legal practices of 
ascribing actions and their merit to specific individuals than with the conditions 
under which these practices would make sense at all (Poole, 1996).  
Distinguishing the ‘metaphysical notion’ of the person as a conscious, 
rational agent from the ‘moral notion’ of the person as an accountable agent 
                                                          
11 This definition was endorsed by Aquinas in the thirteenth century, giving it ‘almost 
authoritative standing’ (List and Pettit, 2011: 171), precisely at the time of Innocent IV’s famous 
definition of the corporation as a persona ficta. Innocent, in other words, was denying that the 
corporation could be a Boethian person. 
12 Like the Boethian person, Locke’s person is an autonomous and private being, confined 
within a ‘first-person world’ (Davis, 2003: 6). 
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possessing rights and responsibilities, Dennett (1976) proceeded to examine the 
conditions under which the two notions overlap. Clearly, he pointed out, there are 
‘conditions that exempt human beings from personhood, or at least some very 
important elements of personhood’ (Dennett, 1976: 175).  
Infants, minors, the mentally disabled and those declared legally insane 
normally cannot be parties to contracts, make legally binding decisions by 
themselves or be held fully accountable for their actions (Honoré, 1999; Cane, 
2002). Of course, this is not to deny that even when their actions cannot be 
imputed to them for these valid reasons, all human beings are ‘persons’ not only in 
common parlance (Teichman, 1985) but also in the broad Kantian sense of ‘ends in 
themselves, i.e., as something that may not be used merely as means’ (Kant, 2002 
[1785]: 46). 
4. From human beings and responsible 
subjects to points of imputation 
This discussion reveals that there are three notions of personhood that need to be 
carefully considered in any examination of legal personality.13 First, there is the 
ordinary language view that ‘person’ and ‘human being’ are interchangeable or co-
extensive (Teichman, 1985). This belief is consistent with the broad Kantian sense, 
and is axiomatic in discussions of ‘human rights’ in which the fact that human 
beings are the ‘natural’ subjects of rights from birth onwards by the mere fact of 
being born human, irrespective of considerations regarding their mental or physical 
                                                          
13 See Naffine’s (2003) useful discussion of these three types. 
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state, is normally taken for granted (Ohlin, 2005).14  
For proponents of this approach, whose periodic table contains all human 
beings (and possibly the unborn), the quality of personhood is not attributed by law 
to human beings (Beitz, 2009). On the contrary, as natural law theorists have long 
argued, positive law is subordinated to the law founded in human nature (Del 
Vecchio, 1920). Human beings, from this perspective, always have ontological, 
explanatory and moral priority (Finnis, 2000).  
As if to illustrate the long-standing dispute between natural law and legal 
positivism, most if not all jurisdictions clearly distinguish between the human 
being and the ‘responsible subject’ (Naffine, 2004: 628). The actions of a person 
thus defined are guided by reason, and this implies, by virtue of what Frankfurt 
(1969: 829) called ‘the principle of alternate possibilities’, both moral and legal 
responsibility. The responsible subject is the ‘ideal legal actor’ (Naffine, 2009: 67) 
or the ‘default legal person’ (Blumenthal, 2007: 1138).  
In fact, many actual legal rules concerning property, contract, standing, 
accountability, and so on, rely on this second view of the person, even though this 
more restrictive definition allows only a subset of human beings – those of a 
certain age and in sufficient possession of their faculties – to be fully admitted the 
                                                          
14 The principle that ‘everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the 
law’, enshrined in Article 6 of the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, is 
intended to ensure that every human being is treated as a subject rather than an object of law in 
every jurisdiction.  
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legal realm.15 When personhood is equated with the responsible subject law’s 
periodic table shrinks.  
Much of the confusion surrounding the issue of the firm’s legal personality is 
due to the tendency to address the matter with only these two, all too often 
conflated, definitions of personhood in mind. When the term ‘person’ is defined as 
either ‘human being’ or ‘responsible subject’, it is clear that the personality 
attributed by law to anything else is at best a fiction. This is essentially Jensen and 
Meckling’s position. However, this inclination to frame the debate exclusively in 
terms of ‘human-size persons’ (Rovane, 1998: 136) has obscured the fact that there 
is a third and more useful possibility.  
When the term ‘person’ is defined in line with its original meaning as ‘mask’ 
worn in the legal drama, it is easy to see that ‘it is [only] the legally-endowed 
capacity to attract legal relations, and hence bear rights and duties, which defines 
the person’ (Naffine, 2003: 366). From this perspective, legal persons are law’s 
essential ‘points of reference’ (Kocourek, 1927: 57) or ‘points of imputation’ 
(Kelsen, 1945: 99) for rights and duties that arise in legal relations.  
A distinctive characteristic of this definition is that it severs the links 
between the flesh-and-blood human being and the legal person. With the additional 
separation between the legal person and the ideal responsible subject, the concept 
of legal personality becomes ‘wholly formal’ (Tur, 1987: 121). As a result, legal 
persons may be ‘of as many kinds as the law pleases’ (Salmond, 1902: 344). This 
                                                          
15 Human beings are not born with complete legal personality but gain it by degrees as they 
grow up ‘by acquiring rights, powers, and duties, which gather cumulatively’ (Tur, 1987: 123).  
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conception of the legal person expands law’s periodic table by opening the gates of 
the legal realm to candidates that would otherwise be excluded.   
Alongside firms of various types, this includes foundations, municipalities, 
states, regional organizations, and international organizations (Wolff, 1938; 
Aufricht, 1943; Frug, 1980; Tiunov, 1993; Paasivirta, 1997), as well as less 
obvious things such as idols, temples and ships (Duff, 1927; McDougal et al., 
1960; Collier, 1992). Further extensions to trees, animals, species, artificial 
intelligences, computers and electronic agents have been proposed (Stone, 1972; 
Varner, 1987; Solum, 1992; Allen and Waddison, 1996; Wise, 2001; Teubner, 
2006).  
On this view, that helps ‘describe with simplicity and accuracy all the 
relevant phenomena of the legal system’ (Nékám, 1938: 70), there is no essential 
difference between the legal personality attributed under certain conditions  to 
human beings and the legal personality attributed under different conditions to 
groups of human beings or organizations such as firms.16 As Deakin (2012: 115-
116) explained, ‘it is no more a ‘fiction’ to assign legal personality to 
organisational structures than it is to grant it to natural persons’. In both cases, the 
capacity to attract rights and duties is not ‘natural’ if this term is taken to mean 
‘pre-legal’. The assignment of the capacity to hold rights and duties is one of the 
                                                          
16 Who or what is regarded as a legal person, and the number and quality of the rights and 
duties thus recognized, will depend on the changing social and political evaluation of the given 
community.  
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constitutive roles of law.17   
Like the legal realm itself, legal personality is always ‘artificial’, but this 
does not mean that it is ‘fictitious’ (Machen, 1911; Dewey, 1926; Fuller, 1967). 
Accordingly, as Koessler (1949: 449) put it, speculations about the reality or 
unreality of legal personality assigned by law to the firm ‘have no more sense than 
speculations about the reality or unreality of the conception of property or of other 
established institutions of a legal nature’.  
Adopting this view does not imply that the attribution of legal personality to 
any inanimate thing, living creature or association of human beings is wholly 
unproblematic, as is clear from the unresolved dispute concerning animal rights 
(Sunstein and Nussbaum, 2004; Kurki, 2015) or the currently intense American 
debate regarding the constitutional rights of business corporations (Ripken, 2011 ; 
Adelstein, 2014). But by creating the conditions in which a discussion of these 
issues is possible without the equivocations that often plague the debate, many 
misunderstandings can surely be avoided. It is important to understand, as Dewey 
(1926: 656) explained, that 
what ‘person’ signifies in popular speech, or in psychology, 
or in philosophy or morals, [is] as irrelevant, to employ an 
exaggerated simile, as it would be to argue that because a 
wine is called ‘dry’, it has the properties of dry solids; or that, 
because it does not have those properties, wine cannot 
                                                          
17 See Gindis (2009), Lawson (2014) and Deakin et al. (forthcoming) for a more detailed discussion 
of law’s constitutive role. 
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possibly be ‘dry’. Obviously, ‘dry’ as applied to a particular 
wine has the kind of meaning, and only the kind of meaning, 
which it has when applied to the class of beverages in 
general. Why should not the same sort of thing hold of the 
use of ‘person’ in law? 
The fear of falling prey to the reification illusion or committing a fatal category 
mistake disappears when the term ‘person’ is purged from its meanings derived 
from ordinary language or psychology or morals. Under these conditions, a 
discussion of the functional role and economic value of law’s assignment of legal 
personality becomes possible.   
5. Concluding comments 
When the law treats the firm as a ‘person’ nothing more than the fact that the firm 
has (not is) a point of imputation for rights and duties that arise in legal relations 
should be implied. The point of imputation is the legal entity in which ownership 
rights over assets used in production are vested, in whose name contracts are made, 
and thanks to which the firm has standing in court. The constitutive legal 
procedure that creates this efficiency-enhancing central contractual agent, entirely 
distinct from all of the human beings involved, is truly what Spulber (2009: 152) 
described as a ‘foundational shift’.  
The assignment of legal entity status transforms what is fundamentally a 
specialized economic undertaking into something that can act as a unit in the legal 
scheme, and it is this unified capacity for property, contract and litigation that 
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carries the organizational framework of the firm (Schanze, 2006; Deakin, 2015). In 
modern market economies, this holds for all observed types of firm 
(entrepreneurial or managerial, capitalist or cooperative, nonhuman asset-intensive 
or human asset-intensive). Debates about what drives the distribution of types do 
not alter this institutional fact. 
For all types of firm the value of operating as a legal entity lies in the 
separation that it introduces between the assets locked-in to guarantee the firm’s 
contractual commitments, and the human beings involved (Hansmann and 
Kraakman, 2000; Rock, 2006; Blair, 2012; Deakin et al., forthcoming).18 As 
compared to bilateral exchange, the firm’s enhanced transactional capabilities stem 
from the fact that its commitments can indefinitely survive changes in its 
membership. Armed with this credible commitment the firm’s founders can pledge 
assets, raise finance and do business in the firm’s own name, such that some even 
thrive. 
It is important to recognize that without the device of legal personality firms 
would be unable to own assets, contract with one another, merge, and act in other 
market-like ways. Most of the firm’s activities would accordingly be difficult to 
sustain, if possible at all. The inclusion of legal personality in the theory of the 
firm narrative is therefore unavoidable (Gindis and Hodgson, 2015), and further 
developments of the legally-grounded view of the firm, that Orts (2013) calls the 
‘institutional theory of the firm’, are warranted.  
                                                          
18 The degree of separation will depend on the type of legal entity. 
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Contrary to the widespread view among economists that legal concepts of the 
firm are not only trivial but also likely to misdirect attention away from the 
economic forces at work, this article has shown than the advancement of our 
understanding of firms and markets requires significantly greater engagement with 
fundamental legal concepts. It is precisely the lack of such an engagement that 
explains the lasting influence of Jensen and Meckling’s ambiguous discussion of 
personalization. The clarification of the legal concept of personhood proposed in 
this article is necessary if the tendency to downplay or ignore the role of law in 
constituting the firm is to be reversed. 
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